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Real  Impediments  to Academic  Biom?dical 
Research 
Wesley  M.  Cohen,  Duke  University  and NBER 
John  P.  Walsh,  Georgia  Institute  of Technology 
Executive  Summary 
Numerous  scholars  have  expressed 
concern  over  the  growing  "privatization  of 
the scientific  commons"  represented  by  the growth  in academic  patenting.  Even 
before  the Bayh-Dole  Act  and  the pervasive  patenting  of academic  science,  how 
ever,  there  was  an  earlier  concern  over  the  extent  to which  the  drive  for  recogni 
tion among  scientists  and  competition  for priority  and  associated  rewards  also 
limited  contributions  to  the  scientific  commons.  This  suggests  the utility  of  a 
more  open-ended  consideration  of  the  different  factors?not  just  patenting? 
that might  affect  knowledge  flows  across  scientists.  In  this  paper,  we  use  a 
simple  economic  perspective  that  emphasizes  the  benefits  and  costs  of  exclud 
ing  others  from  research  results  and  analyze  the  empirical  evidence  on  exclusion 
in biom?dical  research. We  suggest,  first, that one might  distinguish  between  le 
gal  and practical  (i.e.,  lower  cost)  excludability?and  that practical  excludabil 
ity, at  least  in the  world  of academic  research, may  have  little  to do with  patents. 
At  the  same  time, however,  we  suggest  that excludability  may  indeed  be  a real 
concern  for  academic  and,  particularly,  biom?dical  research,  but  to  understand 
where  and how  it occurs, we  need  to look beyond  patents  to consider  additional 
ways  in  which  flows  of  knowledge  and  other  inputs  into  research may  be  re 
stricted  (including  secrecy  and  control  over materials).  We  do  find  restrictions 
imposed 
on  the  flow  of  information  and  materials  across  biom?dical  researchers. 
While  patents  play 
some  role,  they 
are  not  determinative.  What  appears  to mat 
ter  are  both  academic  and  commercial  incentives  and  effective  excludability.  Ex 
clusion  is  rarely  associated  with  the  existence  of  a patent  in academic  settings,  but 
is  more 
readily  achieved  through  secrecy  or  not  sharing  research  materials. 
I.  Introduction 
American  universities  have  rapidly  increased  the patenting  and  licens 
ing  of  their  discoveries  over  the  past  twenty  years.  Patents  issued  to 
American  universities  have  grown  almost  an  order  of magnitude,  from 
434  patents  issued  to universities  in  1983  to 3,259  in 2003,  and  the  pre 2  Cohen  and Walsh 
ponderance  of  these  were  in biomedicine.  In addition,  total  annual  li 
censing  revenue  from  university  inventions  increased  from  about  $200 
million  in  1991  to about  $1.3  billion  in 2003. 
While  the Bayh-Dole  Amendment  of  1981  and  subsequent  legislation 
facilitated  this  growth,  the growth  also  reflected  the  expansion  of patent 
able  subject  matter  to  include  academic  discoveries  in  a  number  of 
domains,  particularly  the  life  sciences,  but  also  software.  The  growth  of 
patenting  also  reflects  a  strengthening  of  ties  between  universities  and 
commerce  more  generally  during  this period,  reflected  partly  in a growth 
of  industry  support  for  academic  research,  but  also  in  increased  interest 
on  the  part  of  some  academic  institutions  in  licensing  and  other  strate 
gies  to  raise  revenues  for  their  institutions.1 
Numerous  scholars  (e.g., Nelson  2004,2006;  Dasgupta  and David  1994; 
Mowery  et  al.  2004;  Eisenberg  2003;  among  others)  have  expressed  con 
cern  over  this  growing  "privatization  of  the  scientific  commons"  (Nelson 
2004,456),  represented  by  the  growth  in academic  patenting.  Their  con 
cern  is that  such  privatization  may  undermine  the norms  and  institutions 
of  "open  science"  and  scientific  advance  itself  by,  among  other  things, 
restricting  access  to  the  upstream  discoveries  and  understandings  that 
are  essential  inputs  to  subsequent  research  (cf. Andrews  et  al.  2006). 
Scientists'  actions  to  restrict  others'  access  to  their  discoveries,  data, 
instruments,  and  other  research  inputs  are  not,  however,  new.  Long  be 
fore  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  and  the widespread  patenting  of  academic  sci 
ence,  scientists  have  limited  their  contributions  to  the  scientific  com 
mons  out  of  concern  over  their  ability  to gain  credit  and  recognition  for 
their  work  (Merton  1973; Hagstrom  1965,  1974).  Even  Galileo,  for  ex 
ample,  was  careful  to  limit  access  to his  telescope  in order  to preserve  his 
priority  and  ensure  credit  for  subsequent  discoveries  (Biagioli  2006). 
In  this  paper,  we  review  our  own  empirical  findings  and  those  of  oth 
ers  to consider  the degree  to  which  the different  types  of  inputs  into  aca 
demic  biom?dical  research?including  others'  patented  and  unpatented 
discoveries,  materials,  data,  and  know-how?may  be  restricted.  We  also 
consider  the  different  means  through  which  such  restrictions  may  be 
imposed,  including  patents,  but  also  secrecy  or  simply  withholding 
materials  or  data.  Third,  we  also  try  to  arrive  at  some  understand 
ing why  scientists  may  impose  such  restrictions  by  adopting  an  eco 
nomic  framework  that  features  the  scientists'  expected  costs  and  bene 
fits  of  excluding  others.  In  this  simple  framework,  costs  may  be  tied, 
for  example,  to  how  readily  different  means  of  control,  such  as  pat 
ents  or  secrecy,  can  be  implemented.  Also,  potential  benefits  may  in 
clude  academic  benefits  such  as  eminence,  promotion,  and  so  on  that Real  Impediments  to  Academic  Biom?dical  Research  3 
come  from  priority  of  discovery  or  the  financial  benefits  that may  be  re 
alized  from  the  commercialization  of  an  academic's  discoveries. 
Our  consideration  of  a broad  range  of  research  inputs  raises  a ques 
tion  about  the  degree  to which,  and  what  aspects  of,  scientific  research 
contributes  to  a  "scientific  commons,"  even  absent  patents.  Of  course, 
what  had  been  traditionally  located  in  this  "commons"  were  published 
research  findings  that were  available  for use  by  others.  What  has  pre 
sumably  alarmed  Nelson  and  others  about  the  diffusion  of  academic 
patenting  is  that  there  is now  a  legal  basis  for  excluding  others  from  us 
ing  such  published  information  and  findings.  In  this  paper,  as  noted 
in  the  preceding,  we  are  concerned  not  only,  however,  with  access  to 
patented  knowledge,  but  also  to  unpatented  inputs  into  research 
since  not  all  the  information  or  research  inputs  that  are  usefully  ex 
changed  across  scientists?such  as materials,  unpublished  findings,  data, 
or know-how?are  patented  or  even  patentable.  And  for  those  research 
findings  and  inputs  that  are  patented,  we  distinguish  between  the  legal 
and  "practical"  (i.e.,  readily  achievable)  excludability  conferred  by 
patents  and  examine  the degree  to  which  patents  actually  restrict  access. 
To  prefigure  the  following  discussion,  we  indeed  observe  restrictions 
imposed  on  the flow  of  information  and materials  across  biom?dical  re 
searchers.  The  observed  forms  of  exclusion  are  consistent  with  the  no 
tion  that  scientists  impose  restrictions  on  access  to findings  and  research 
inputs  in  response  to  the  expected  costs  and  benefits  of  such  exclusion. 
We  also  find  that  both  academic  and  commercial  incentives  matter.  Of 
particular  importance  for  current  policy  discussions,  we  find  that  exclu 
sion  in academic  settings  rarely  involves  the  assertion  of  a patent,  but  is 
more  typically  associated  with  secrecy  or  the withholding  of  research 
materials,  suggesting  that  the means  of  restriction  employed  and  the 
sorts  of  flows  involved  (i.e.,  knowledge,  materials,  data)  depend  upon 
the  associated  costs. We  also  find,  however,  that  even  where  the  cost  of 
imposing  a  restriction  is  low,  as  through  the withholding  of materials, 
the vast  majority  of  academics  comply  with  requests,  suggesting  either 
that  academics  also  benefit  from  such  sharing  or  that  powerful  social 
norms  around  sharing  still  apply. 
II.  Why  Knowledge  Flows  Matter 
How  might  limiting  access  to research  findings  or  inputs  affect  scientific 
advance?  This  can  occur  in  several  ways.  As  Nelson  (2004)  argues,  lim 
iting  the  use  of  upstream  discoveries  in  follow-on  research  to  solve  a 
particular  problem  will  constrain  the number  of  researchers  working  on 4  Cohen  and Walsh 
a problem  and,  hence,  the  range  of  approaches  pursued  and  capabilities 
deployed.  In  the  face  of  ex  ante  uncertainty  surrounding  the best  way  of 
solving  technical  and  scientific  problems,  a  restricted  set  of  approaches 
or  scientists  may  compromise  the  performance  attributes  of whatever 
solution  is arrived  at ex post  (cf. Evenson  and  Kislev  1976; Nelson  1982), 
relative  to  what  might  have  been.2 
Restricted  access  to  the  fruits  of  others'  research  may  also  limit  the  re 
alization  of  complementarities  or  efficiencies  across  researchers.  For  ex 
ample,  knowledge  of  a promising  cell  receptor  implicated  in  some  dis 
ease  process  may  well  offer  important  guidance  to other  researchers  in 
the  field  who  could  potentially  build  on  that  discovery.  And  some  of 
those  researchers  may  have  special  skills  or  access  to other  specialized 
assets  (such  as  libraries  of  compounds  or  special  patient  populations) 
that  confer  special  advantages  in  the use  of  that knowledge.  Restrictions 
on  access  to  that  target  that  foreclose  or  limit  others'  use  of  that  discov 
ery may  thus  prevent  the  combining  of  these  complementary  assets  and 
capabilities  and,  in  turn,  compromise  follow-on  discovery. 
Restrictions  on  knowledge  flows  could  also  impede  efficiencies  real 
ized  through  the  elimination  of  duplicative  research.  Such  efficiencies 
may  take  the  form  of  knowing  that  someone  else  has  succeeded  in 
achieving  a particular  outcome  that  you  were  working  on  in your  own 
lab, with  the  consequence  that  it  was  no  longer  useful  to keep  at  it. Al 
ternatively,  knowledge  that  a particular  approach  had  failed  may  spare 
others  the  cost  of  pursuing  that  approach. 
Although  restrictions  placed  on  the  flow  and  exchange  of  research 
findings  and  inputs  may  impede  scientific  progress  in the different  ways 
outlined  in  the  preceding,  they  need  not.  There  is a potentially  impor 
tant  offsetting  effect  associated  with  such  restrictions.  Scientists'  ability 
to  limit  or  delay  access  to  their  findings,  materials,  data,  and  know-how 
may  increase  the  expected  returns  to  their  research  and  thus  increase  the 
incentive  to do  the  research  to begin  with.  Although  the  empirical  liter 
ature  provides  no  sense  of  the  importance  of  this  appropriability  incen 
tive  effect,  its possibility  suggests  a  trade-off  between  the  benefits  that 
society  and  even  individual  scientists  may  derive  from  the  free  flow  of 
knowledge  and  other  research  inputs,  versus  any  incentive-dampening 
effect  that may  be  associated  with  such  flows. 
III.  The  Payoff  to Exclusionary  Practices  and  Priority  of Discovery 
To  understand  why  academic  scientists  might  restrict  access  to  either 
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off  s  to  such  behavior.  We  suggest  that  one  perceived  payoff  from  such 
exclusionary  behavior  is a greater  likelihood  of  coming  up  with  a dis 
covery  first.  Indeed,  priority  of  discovery  has  been  widely  recognized 
for  decades  as  a motivation  for  scientific  research  and  stressed  in  the 
seminal  writings  of Merton  (1957)  as well  as  in  the more  recent  writings 
on  the  economics  of  science  by  Dasgupta  and  David  (1987,  1994)  and 
Stephan  (1996). 
But  what  is  the  payoff  from  winning  a priority  race?  Clearly,  it  re 
dounds  to an  academic's  reputation  among  his  or her  peers  and,  in turn, 
professional  esteem  or  eminence.  In addition  to gratifying  the  scientist 
emotionally,  the  esteem  of  peers  also  confers  tangible  benefits  of  aca 
demic  promotion,  including  the  award  of  tenure,  career  security,  and 
endowed  chairs,  as well  as  the prospect  of outside  income  gained  through 
consulting  and  speaking  fees  (see  Stephan  1996). When  eminence  is of  a 
sufficient  level,  it can materially  affect  income,  and when  it also  confers 
job mobility  across  institutions,  it can  raise  income  quite  substantially, 
depending  upon  the  field.  Eminence  yields  the  other  tangible  benefit  of 
conferring  an  advantage  in the  competition  for grants  whose  awards  are 
importantly  influenced  by  the  reputation  of  the  applicants.  Depending 
on  the  field,  grants  can  be  critical  to  the  conduct  of  academic  research  it 
self.  This  is  surely  true  of  biomedicine,  where  researchers  may  require 
lab  space,  equipment,  and  access  to  materials,  animals,  and  possibly  hu 
man  subjects. 
The  benefits  conferred  by  priority  are  also  not  of  a one-time  character. 
Rather,  as pointed  out  by Merton  (1968)  in his  discussion  of  the  Matthew 
effect  in  science,  they  are  self-reinforcing  (see  also  Allison  and  Stewart 
1974;  Cole  and  Cole  1973).  Reputation  influences  the  award  of  grant 
money  that  is essential  to  the  conduct  of  research?and  hence  the  abil 
ity  to come  up with  the next  discovery,  which  in  turn  redounds  to repu 
tation.  Reputation  not  only  affects  support.  It also  affects  an  academic's 
ability  to  attract  quality  students,  who,  in  turn,  affect  the  researcher's 
ability  to  succeed,  and  so  on.  Thus,  there  is a  cycle  in  which  significant 
publication  begets  resources,  which  enables  subsequent  research  and 
publication,  which  reinforces  reputation,  and  so on.  Thus,  the  rewards  to 
priority  are  not  only  substantial  at  a point  in  time,  but  over  time,  impor 
tantly  influencing  the  arc  of  scientific  careers  (Allison  and  Stewart  1974; 
Cole  and  Cole  1973).3 As  a consequence,  scientists  are motivated  not  only 
by  the  rewards  to priority  for  any  given  discovery,  but  also  by  the  ex 
pectation  of  the  follow-on  findings  that  a given  discovery  may  open  up. 
Traditionally,  the prospect  of  priority  of  discovery  is seen  as motivat 
ing  dissemination  and  access  rather  than  secrecy  and  exclusion.  Build 6  Cohen  and Walsh 
ing  on Merton's  (1957)  earlier  insight,  Dasgupta  and David  suggest  that 
the  virtue  of  the  priority-based  system  is  that,  to generate  the  private 
good  of  reputation  in  a priority-based  system,  scholars  must  publish 
and,  hence,  make  available  their  findings  for all  to  see  and?at  least  un 
til  recently?to  use.4  They  state,  "Priority  creates  a privately-owned  as 
set?a  form  of  intellectual  property?from  the very  act  of  relinquishing 
exclusive  possession  of  the new  knowledge"  (Dasgupta  and David  1987, 
531,  as  cited  in Stephan  1996,1206).  Stephan  and  Levin  (1996,1206)  fur 
ther  argue  that  this  system  based  on  reputation  also  provides  an  incen 
tive  to  the  scholar  to encourage  wider  dissemination  to  further  augment 
their  reputation,  thus  providing  "a  mechanism  for  capturing  the  exter 
nalities  associated  with  discovery."  Thus,  the  suggestion  is one  of  a  fe 
licitous  consistency  between  the  achievement  of  the  reputational  bene 
fits  of  priority  and  social  welfare.5 
Yet  the  objective  of  priority  of  discovery  and  the  academic  reputation 
that devolves  from  it advance  disclosure  only  to a point.  While  academic 
scientists  will  typically  disclose  that which  is  required  to persuade  the 
scientific  community  of  the merit  and  validity  of  their  discoveries,  there 
are  intermediate  inputs  into  that work  that  are  often  not  disclosed  or 
otherwise  made  publicly  available,  including  data,  materials,  knowl 
edge  of methods,  and  other  information.  Following  Stephan  (1996)  and 
Eisenberg  (1987),  we  suggest  that  scientific  competition  may  dampen 
researchers'  willingness  to disclose  or  share  these  various  inputs  that  are 
potentially  vital  to others'  work.6 
In  addition  to  the  returns  to  exclusionary  behavior  that might  re 
dound  to  a  scientist's  academic  career,  another  potential  payoff  to  ex 
clusionary  behavior  is  the  prospect  of  financial  gain  from  the  commer 
cialization  of  discoveries?a  benefit  that  has  become  more  salient  with 
the  proliferation  of  university-based  start-ups  and  licensing  income 
over  the  past  twenty-five  years  in  the  life  sciences.  The  concern  here  is 
that  such  commercial  motives  may  provide  not  only  incentives  for  re 
stricting  dissemination  of  research  inputs,  resembling  the  effect  of  sci 
entific  competition,  but may  also  compromise  academics'  interest  in dis 
closing  their  discoveries  either  fully  or promptly  when  such  disclosure 
diminishes  a proprietary  commercial  advantage.7 
The  observation  that  the  prospect  of  commercial  returns  may  com 
promise  an  academic's  motive  to  fully  and  promptly  disclose  their  re 
search  findings  raises  the question  for academics  of  the degree  to  which 
commercial  and  academic  incentives  to disclose  research  conflict.  The 
interaction  of  these  two  sets  of  incentives  is  complicated.  On  the  one Real  Impediments  to  Academic  Biom?dical  Research  7 
hand,  the  two motives  may  work  together  to  reinforce  the  drive  to dis 
seminate  research  findings  and  undermine  it at  the  same  time  (or  in dif 
ferent  settings).  In some  contemporary  academic  research  communities, 
commercial  activity  still  does  not  accord  status,  and  rarely  does  it confer 
academic  promotion  (Berkovitz  and  Feldman  2006).  Indeed,  commer 
cial  activity  can  detract  from  the  esteem  of  academic  peers  and,  hence, 
provide  lower  levels  of  reputational  and  associated  rewards.  Zucker  and 
Darby  (1996)  suggest,  however,  that  in biomedicine,  commercial  motives 
may  reinforce  academic  motives  of  priority  and  publication  because  it 
tends  to be  the  recognized  "star  scientists"  who  play  dominant  roles  in 
founding  start-ups  based  on  academic  discoveries.  Even  if scientists  re 
quire  publication  to establish  or  reinforce  their  "star"  status,  commercial 
motivation  may  nonetheless  compromise  the  coincidence  between  their 
academic  ambitions  and  full  dissemination  of  the  details  of  their  dis 
coveries.  A  start-up's  success  will  necessarily  depend  upon  a  propri 
etary  advantage,  whose  source  is  typically  some  sort  of  know-how  or 
information  that  is not  publicly  available.  Although  Zucker  and  Darby 
(1996)  argue  that  there  is a  strong  tacit  element  in biom?dical  research 
that  star  scientists  are  able  to keep  private  and  exploit  as  the  basis  for 
founding  firms,  not  only  tacit  elements  may  be  kept  private. 
IV.  How  Academics  Appropriate  the Returns  to Discovery  and 
Implications  for  Flows  of Knowledge  and  Other  Inputs 
In  this  section,  we  briefly  consider  how  academics  increase  their  ability 
to  appropriate  academic  and  commercial  returns  to discovery  and  the 
implications  of  these  different  strategies  for  flows  of  knowledge  and 
other  research  inputs.8  One  strategy  that  strengthens  a  scientist's  abil 
ity  to achieve  dominance  in a  field,  through  either  the  quality  or  speed 
of  discovery,  includes  the  deployment  of  complementary  capabilities, 
which  can  include  able  students,  lab  infrastructure,  and  access  to  finan 
cial  support.  Academic  reputation  itself  can  be  considered  a  comple 
mentary  asset  inasmuch  as  it confers  more  ready  access  to resources  and 
to  journal  outlets.  Such  reliance  on  complementary  capabilities  does  not, 
in  itself,  compromise  disclosure  of  either  findings  or  the  exchange  of  re 
search  inputs?and  may  actually  accelerate  both. 
A  commonly  featured  strategy  among  academics  that  does  dampen 
knowledge  and  material  flows  is  secrecy  (Merton  1957).  This  can  take 
several  forms.  One  is refusing  to discuss  ongoing  research  until  priority 
has  been  established  through  publication  (Hagstrom  1974; Walsh  and 8  Cohen  and Walsh 
Hong  2003)  ? Such  secrecy  can be  taken  further  by  limiting  the disclosure 
of  research  findings  through  publication  delay  or  incomplete  publish 
ing  (Blumenthal  et al.  1997;  Walsh,  Jiang,  and  Cohen  2006).10 Researchers 
may  also  withhold  the  data  upon  which  published  findings  are  based 
or withhold  supplemental  information  that  is useful  but  not  typically 
provided  in  the publication  (such  as phenotypic  information  or protein 
structures).  Researchers  may  also  limit  the  distribution  of  difficult-to 
obtain  material  research  inputs  or  the material  embodiments  of  research 
findings  (such  as  new  materials,  equipment,  cell  lines,  etc.)  in order  to 
protect  the  discoverers'  advantage  in conducting  any  research  that may 
build  upon  the  prior  discovery  (Campbell  et  al.  2002; Walsh,  Cho,  and 
Cohen  2007).11  There  is also  tacit  and  other  private  knowledge  gener 
ated  in the  course  of  conducting  research  that  scientists  may  be  reluctant 
to disseminate. 
Academics  (and  their  institutions)  may  also  use  patents  to  restrict  ac 
cess  to published  findings  and  research  inputs,  typically  to  enable  the 
commercialization  of  discoveries  through  the  creation  of  start-ups  or 
licensing  to existing  firms.  Indeed,  a key  feature  of  patented  discover 
ies  is  that,  though  disclosed,  they  cannot  in principle  be  used  by  others 
without  permission.12  In  addition  to  conferring  a  legal  basis  for  re 
stricting  access  to  scientific  discoveries,  patents  may  also  increase  a  re 
searcher's  incentive  to  restrict  access  by  enabling  the  commercialization 
of  his  or  her  discoveries.13 
The  ways  in  which  patents  may  restrict  knowledge  flows  may  be  dis 
tinguished  on  the  basis  of whether  it  is a question  of  gaining  access  to 
one  or  a  small  number  of  patents,  perhaps  associated  with  some  foun 
dational  discovery,  or  gaining  access  to  a  large  number  of  patents. 
Merges  and  Nelson  (1990) and Scotchmer  (1991)  highlight  the possibil 
ity  that, where  innovation  is cumulative,  the  assertion  of patents  on  key 
upstream  discoveries  may  significantly  restrict  follow-on  research.14 
The  patenting  of numerous,  individually  less  significant  discoveries  may 
also  impede  academic  research.  Although  their  focus  is  largely  on  com 
mercial  projects,  Heller  and  Eisenberg  (1998)  and  Shapiro  (2000)  suggest 
that  the  patenting  of  a broad  range  of  research  tools  that  researchers 
need  to do  their work  has  spawned  "patent  thickets"  that may  make  the 
acquisition  of  licenses  and  other  rights  too  burdensome  to permit  the 
pursuit  of what  should  otherwise  be  scientifically  and  socially  worth 
while  research,  (engendering  a  tragedy  of  the  "anticommons"  [Heller 
and  Eisenberg  1998]).15 Real  Impediments  to  Academic  Biom?dical  Research  9 
V.  What  We  Know  about  Restrictions  on  Flows  of  Research  Inputs 
in Biomedicine 
In  this  section,  we  review  the  empirical  evidence  on  restricted  access  to 
research  inputs  where  such  inputs  can  include  the  research  findings  of 
others,  information  and  data,  and  research  materials  of  a  more  interme 
diate  character.  As  noted  in  the preceding,  we  will  broaden  our  consid 
eration  of  restricted  flows  of  research  inputs  beyond  patented  discover 
ies.  We  do  this  because  not  all  the  information  or  research  inputs  that  are 
usefully  exchanged  across  researchers  are  patented  or  even  patentable. 
Moreover,  we  consider  the material  flows  as well  as  knowledge  flows 
across  biom?dical  researchers  because  restrictions  on material  sharing 
can  have  many  of  the  same  effects  on  scientific  advance  as  restrictions  on 
the  use  of  disembodied  knowledge.  We  focus  on  three  types  of  restric 
tions  distinguished  by  the  nature  of  the  research  input  in question.  The 
first  is the use  of patents  to deny  access  to published  knowledge.  The  sec 
ond  is the use  of  secrecy  to keep  all or part  of  a research  result  from  being 
published  immediately  or  to keep  proprietary  control  over  data  and  other 
unpublished  knowledge  inputs.  Finally,  there  is  the  use  of  control  over 
research  materials  to deny  access  to  the  inputs  for  follow-on  research. 
Access  to Patented  Findings  and  Techniques 
We  begin  with  restrictions  on  published  information  associated  with 
patents.  Because  patents  confer  the  right  to exclude  others  from  practic 
ing  the  patented  invention,  they  can  be  used  to prevent  other  scientists 
from making  use  of  published  research  results  if  those  results  are  also 
patented  (cf. Ducor  2000; Murray  and  Stern  2005). 
Patent-related  restrictions  on  access  to knowledge  of  a discovery  can 
take  numerous  forms.  Any  positive  price  for access  to  intellectual  prop 
erty  potentially  restricts  access.  In addition  to  licensing  fees,  restrictions 
may  also  be  imposed  through  terms  of  exclusivity  and  other  conditions 
of  use  (e.g.,  reach-through  terms,  demands  for  coauthorship,  etc.)  as 
well  as  the  transactions  costs  highlighted  by Heller  and  Eisenberg  (1998) 
that  potentially  impose  a burden  on  researchers.  Another  way  in  which 
patents  can  restrict  access  is by  simply  signaling  a possibility  of  infringe 
ment  liability  and,  in  turn,  litigation,  with  its attendant  costs.  Eisenberg 
(2003)  suggests  that  the  growth  of  patenting  of upstream  discoveries  by 
universities  and  firms  may  now  impede  follow-on  academic  and  other 10  Cohen  and Walsh 
research,  particularly  since  the Madey  v. Duke  decision,  which  made  it 
clear  that  academic  research  does  not  confer  any  shield  against  in 
fringement  liability.  Similarly,  Andrews  et  al.  (2006)  argue  that  the  re 
cent  Supreme  Court  ruling  in  the  LabCorp  v.  Metabolite  case  shows  that 
basic  facts  of  nature  are  patentable  and  that  such  patents  will  impede 
scientists'  ability  to conduct  their  research. 
Several  studies  have  attempted  to  estimate  the  incidence  of  such 
patent-related  access  restrictions,  including  both  the problem  of  access 
ing  a  small  number  of  patents  associated  with  fundamental  upstream 
discoveries  as well  as  the  problem  of  acquiring  rights  to a multitude  of 
complementary  technologies.  First,  one  might  ask whether  knowledge 
and  other  inputs  to biom?dical  research  are  commonly  patented.  Indeed, 
there  are  a  large  number  of  patents  associated  with  genes,  for  example. 
A  recent  study  found  that  nearly  20 percent  of  human  genes  had  at  least 
one  patent  associated  with  them,  and many  had  multiple  patents  (Jensen 
and Murray  2005).  Another  study  estimated  that  in  the United  States, 
over  3,000  new  DNA-related  patents  are  issued  each  year  (National  Re 
search  Council  2005,  figure  4-1).  Prior  work  on  licensing  of  university 
based  inventions  suggests  that  the majority  are  licensed  exclusively 
(AUTM  2000;  Henry  et  al.  2002;  Pressman  et  al.  2006).16  Thus,  the  pre 
conditions  for patents  restricting  access  exist  in biom?dical  research. 
Studies  that  have  examined  the  incidence  of  access  or  anticommons 
problems  find  them,  however,  to be  rare,  even  for  industry  scientists,  and 
especially  so  for  academic  scientists  (Nagaoka  2006; Nicol  and  Nielsen 
2003;  Straus  2002;  Walsh,  Arora,  and  Cohen  2003a;  Walsh,  Cho,  and 
Cohen  2005; Walsh  et  al.  2007).  For  example,  in  their  limited,  interview 
based  study, Walsh  et  al.  (2003b)  find  that,  although  complaints  about  ac 
cess  to patented  technologies  and  findings  are  not  rare  (about  one-third 
of  their  respondents  mentioned  some  issue  regarding  limits  on  access 
ing  others'  intellectual  property  [IP]),  such  limitations  never  caused  the 
academic  scientists  among  their  interviewees  to  stop  a promising  line  of 
research.  Finally,  they  find  no  evidence  of  academics  being  excluded 
from  research  due  to patents  on  research  inputs  (although  the  sample  of 
academics  in  that  study  was  small  and  not  representative).  Walsh  et  al. 
(2003b)  also  find  virtually  no  instances  of  industrial  or  academic  re 
searchers  being  stopped  due  to  an  inability  to  gain  access  to  a  large 
number  of patents  needed  for  a research  project.  In a  subsequent  survey 
research  study  using  a much  larger,  random  sample  of  academic  bio 
medical  researchers,  Walsh,  Cho,  and  Cohen  (2005,2007)  confirm  these 
earlier  qualitative  results  for academics  with  the  finding  that  only  1 per Real  Impediments  to  Academic  Biom?dical  Research  11 
cent  of  academic  researchers  (i.e.,  those  in universities,  nonprofits,  and 
government  labs)  report  having  to delay  a project,  and  none  abandoned 
a project  due  to  others'  patents,  suggesting  that  neither  anticommons 
nor  restrictions  on  access  were  seriously  limiting  academic  research.17 
Another  piece  of  evidence  both  partially  explaining  this  finding  and 
suggesting  that  academics  appear  to be  little  concerned  with  the  pos 
sibility  that  their  research  may  be  infringing  others'  patents  is  that  only 
5 percent  of  the  academic  scientists  surveyed  regularly  check  for  rele 
vant  patents.18  With  the  important  exception  of  gene  patents  that  cover 
a  diagnostic  test,  the Walsh  et  al.  finding  that  patents  have  rarely 
blocked  academic  research  have  been  replicated  with  other  samples  and 
in other  countries  (Straus  2002; Nicol  and Nielson  2003; Nagaoka  2006; 
Walsh  et  al.2007).19 
Even  if patents  do  not  stop  ongoing  research,  the  very  prospect  of  a 
thicket  or  restricted  access  may  dissuade  researchers  from  choosing  par 
ticular  projects  and  limit  lines  of  attack  in  that way.  To  explore  this  pos 
sibility,  Walsh,  Cho,  and  Cohen  (2007)  asked  academic  respondents  to 
assess  the  importance  of  reasons  that may  have  dissuaded  them  from 
moving  ahead  with  the most  recent  project  that  they  had  seriously  con 
sidered  but  had  not  pursued.  The  most  pervasively  reported  reasons 
why  projects  are  not  pursued  include  lack  of  funding  (62 percent)  or be 
ing  too busy  (60 percent).  Scientific  competition  (too many  others  work 
ing  on  the problem)  was  also  an  important  reason  for not  pursuing  proj 
ects  (29 percent).  Technology  control  rights,  such  as  terms  demanded  for 
access  to  needed  research  inputs  (10  percent)  and  patents  covering 
needed  research  inputs  (3 percent),  were  significantly  less  likely  to be 
mentioned.  Respondents  doing  research  on  drugs  and  therapies  were, 
however,  somewhat  more  likely  to  report  that  unreasonable  terms  de 
manded  for  research  inputs  were  an  important  reason  for  them  not  to 
pursue  a  project.  These  results  are  broadly  consistent  with  Sampat's 
(2004)  and,  especially,  Murray  and  Stern's  (2005)  findings  of  a decrease 
in  the  citations  to  a paper  (on  the  order  of  10 percent  of  expected  cita 
tions)  after  the published  result  is patented,  particularly  because  the  lat 
ter  study  sampled  from  a  population  of  scientists  working  closer  to 
downstream  and  commercial  applications.20  These  several  results  sug 
gest  that  there may  be  some  redirection  of  effort  away  from  areas  where 
there  are  patents  on  research  results,  especially  in more  commercially 
motivated  domains.  The  overall  social  welfare  implications  of  this  re 
direction  are,  however,  uncertain  as  there  is both  a potential  loss  from 
having  fewer  people  work  on  a problem  and  a potential  gain  from  hav 12  Cohen  and Walsh 
ing  a  socially  more  diverse  research  portfolio  (Cole  and  Cole  1972; Das 
gupta  and Maskin  1987). 
Limits  on Practical  Excludability  of Patented  Knowledge 
An  important  reason  why  patents  do  not  limit  access  to published  re 
search  results  is  that  researchers  in  firms  and  academia  employ  a  suite 
of  "working  solutions"  to  the  access  and  anticommons  problems  (Walsh 
et al.  2003a).  Within  firms,  in addition  to  licensing  (Pressman  et  al.  2006), 
these  "working  solutions"  include  inventing  around,  locating  research 
and  development  (R&D)  facilities  in  jurisdictions  where  the  research 
tool  patents  in  question  have  not  been  applied  for,  challenging  ques 
tionable  patents,  and  using  the  technology  without  a  license.21  Although 
Walsh,  Arora,  and  Cohen  (2003a)  and Walsh  et  al.  (2007)  cannot  know 
the  rate  at which  academics  may  have  actually  infringed  patents,  the  ex 
istence  of numerous  research  tool  patents  noted  in the preceding  and  the 
fact  that  academics  rarely  check  for patents  suggest  that  academics  com 
monly  use  technology  without  a  license,  although  perhaps  unknow 
ingly.  It has  been  suggested,  however,  that  academics'  use  of  patented 
technology  without  a  license  reflects  an  inappropriate  and  possibly  un 
stable  practice  (Eisenberg  2003;  National  Research  Council  2003,2005). 
It  is  important  to  remember,  however,  that  the  stability  of  this  unli 
censed  use  is supported  by  a  combination  of  the  difficulty  of  enforcing 
patents  due  to  the  secrecy  of  research  programs,  the  cost  of  litigation, 
and  a  common  interest  among  patent  owners  in  allowing  such  use. 
Patent  owners  may  engage  in "rational  forbearance"  (National  Research 
Council  1997)  of  others'  possible  infringement  both  because  the  infring 
ing  research  can  add  value  to  the  patent  and  because  forbearance  can 
generate  goodwill  that  is needed  to  encourage  information  exchange 
with  other  researchers  in  the  field  (Kieff  2001; Walsh,  Arora,  and  Cohen 
2003a).22  Because  research  communities  are  often  small  and  reputation 
is  important  (even  for  industry  scientists),  aggressive  enforcement  of 
patent  rights  may  be  too  costly  if  it undermines  the  goodwill  that  is es 
sential  to others'  future  cooperation  (for  sharing  information,  materials, 
and  informal  access  to patented  technologies).23 
Thus,  the  low  incidence  of  access  or  anticommons  problems  relative 
to  the  large  numbers  of  researchers  or projects  that may  be  at  risk  should 
not  come  as  a  surprise.24  A  key  factor  preventing  such  a  failure  in aca 
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that  it  is hard  to detect  infringement  or  enforce  the  right  to exclude  if  it 
is detected.  Assuming  that  a patent  owner  can  even  detect  an unautho 
rized  use  of  one  of his  or her  patented  discoveries  by  another  researcher, 
sending  a warning  letter may  have  little  impact,  and  a  lawsuit  is an  ex 
pensive  and  risky  proposition,  with  the  expected  payoff  (injunction 
against  research  that  is finished  and  "reasonable  royalties"  on  a  small 
scale  use  of  the  research  tool)  quite  small,  especially  when  weighed 
against  the  cost  of  substantial  legal  fees  as well  as  the possible  loss  of  the 
patent  right.  Thus,  although  a patent  may  confer  a  legal  right  to exclude, 
it does  not  confer  "practical  excludability"  in  academic  research  set 
tings.  As  we  will  see,  the  same  is not  true  for  control  over  privately  held 
research  materials,  data,  or not-yet-published  results.  In  these  cases,  ex 
cludability  is  more  readily  achieved. 
Practically  Excludable  Research  Inputs 
In  this  section,  we  begin  to consider  the degree  to  which  we  observe  re 
strictions  on  access  to privately  held  research  inputs,  including  materi 
als,  data,  or  unpublished  research  findings.  Access  to  others'  research 
materials  in particular  is vital  to  the  conduct  of  biom?dical  research  (cf. 
Furman  and  Stern  2005).  Walsh  et  al.  (2007),  for  example,  report  that 
over  the  two-year  period,  2003  to  2004,  academic  researchers  in  ge 
nomics  and  proteomics  reported  making  an  average  of nine  requests  for 
materials,  seven  to other  academics  and  two  to  industry  scientists.  Ex 
amples  of material  inputs  are  an  organism  (e.g., OncoMouse),  a cell  line 
(e.g.,  human  embryonic  stem  cells),  a protein  (e.g.,  purified  eurythro 
poetin),  or  a drug  (e.g.,  a  statin  for  studying  the  cholesterol  cycle).  Ex 
amples  of  unpublished  information  of  use  to other  researchers  include 
phenotypic  information  on  a  mouse  or  the  three-dimensional  structure 
of  a protein. 
As  suggested  in  the  preceding,  due  to  the  challenges  and  disadvan 
tages  of  asserting  patents,  it  is costly  to  control  the use  of  patented  dis 
coveries  in academic  biom?dical  research  settings.  In contrast,  it is  much 
less  costly  in academic  settings  to  control  the use  of  privately  held  ma 
terials  and  data  where  such  inputs  are  difficult  to  replicate.25  Detection 
of  the use  of  such  inputs  is not  difficult  because  a prospective  user  must 
request  the  input. Moreover,  the owner  must  actively  cooperate  with  the 
prospective  user  to provide  access.  This  requirement  of  active  coopera 
tion  provides  owners  of  privately  held  inputs  more  control  and  less  ex 14  Cohen  and Walsh 
pensive  means  of  control  over  access  relative  to owners  of  IP.  An  owner 
of  a material  or  data,  for  example,  can  deny  access  by  simply  not  re 
sponding  to a  request,  effecting  exclusion  at  little  cost.  Also,  the burden 
of  initiating  the  exercise  of  control  over  access  falls  on  the  owner  in  the 
case  of  patented  knowledge,  whereas,  for materials  or  other  privately 
held  inputs,  it falls  on  the prospective  user  who  must  submit  a  request. 
Finally,  compared  to owners  of  "pure"  intellectual  property,  owners  of 
materials  and  other  privately  held  inputs  face  greater  out-of-pocket 
costs  to  satisfy  rather  than  deny  requests  as  granting  typically  entails 
replication  of materials,  shipping,  preparing  data,  and  so  on.  Thus,  the 
costs  of  excluding  others  from  using  materials,  data,  unpublished  find 
ings,  and  so  on  are much  less  than  excluding  others  from  accessing 
patented  discoveries. 
In  the  following  sections,  we  discuss  the  limits  on  access  to unpub 
lished  information  and materials  to demonstrate  empirically  that  these 
are more  practically  excludable  research  inputs  as  compared  to pure  in 
tellectual  property. 
Scientific  Secrecy:  Withholding  of Unpublished/Intermediate  Findings 
There  is  evidence  of  significant  secrecy  among  university  researchers 
with  regard  to unpublished  findings  or  data  (Blumenthal  et  al.  1997; 
Campbell  et  al.  2002; Walsh  and  Hong  2003; Walsh,  Cho,  and  Cohen 
2005).  As  noted  in  the  preceding,  the  employment  of  a  range  of  strate 
gies  to protect  the  rewards  from  priority  has  long  been  known  in  sci 
ence.  Hagstrom  (1974)  notes  that  this  type  of  secrecy  was  common  in 
science,  even  in  the  1960s,  especially  in experimental  biology.  Walsh  and 
Hong  (2003)  find  that  secrecy  has  increased  in physics,  mathematics, 
and,  especially,  in  experimental  biology  from  the  1960s  to  the  1990s, 
along  with  concern  over  scientific  competition.  These  several  examples 
suggest  that  such  secrecy  is endemic  in  science  and  especially  so  in ex 
perimental  biology. 
In addition  to  scientific  competition,  commercial  incentives  can  also 
motivate  secrecy.  Walsh  et al.  (2007)  report  that  7 percent  of  the academic 
biom?dical  researchers  surveyed  acknowledged  that,  in order  to protect 
the  commercial  value  of  an  invention  or  discovery,  they  delayed  publi 
cation  of  their  research  results  for more  than  one month  at  least  once  in 
the  last  two  years.  Four  percent  reported  that  during  the  last  two  years 
they,  at  least  once,  decided  not  to publish  a  result  in order  to protect  the 
commercial  value  of  their  findings.26 Real  Impediments  to  Academic  Biom?dical  Research  15 
Restricting  Access  through  Control  over Materials 
There  is also  evidence  that  scientists  are  often  denied  access  to others'  re 
search  materials.  Walsh  et  al.  (2007)  find  that,  as  reported  by  those  mak 
ing  requests,  19 percent  of  recent  requests  were  not  fulfilled  and  that  at 
least  8 percent  of  respondents  had  a project  delayed  due  to  inability  to 
obtain  timely  access  to  research  materials  (compared  to  less  than  1 per 
cent who  were  delayed  by  inability  to obtain  a patent  license).  Further 
more,  Walsh  et  al.  (2007)  find  that,  among  genomics  researchers,  the  rate 
of withholding  research  materials  appears  to  have  increased  from  10 
percent  of  requests  in  the  1997  to  1999  period  (Campbell  et al.  2002)  to  18 
percent  (?3.7  percent)  of  requests  in  the  2003  to 2004  period,  possibly  re 
flecting  a  significant  increase  in a  short  time.  This  failure  to  receive  re 
quested  research  materials  can  have  a negative  impact  on  individuals' 
research  programs  (Campbell  et al.  2002; Walsh,  Cho,  and  Cohen  2005).27 
Campbell  et  al.  (2002)  reported,  for  example,  that  28  percent  of  all  ge 
neticists  reported  they  had  difficulty  replicating  published  results,  and 
24 percent  had  their  own  publication  significantly  delayed.  Walsh  et  al. 
(2007)  find  that  one  in nine  scientists  had  to abandon  a project  each  year 
due  to an unfulfilled  request  for materials  or  information.  Thus,  where 
practical  excludability  exists,  we  see  some  evidence  that  it is being  exer 
cised.  These  findings  raise  the  question  of what  motivates  scientists  to 
exclude  others  from  using  their materials  and  other  inputs. 
Reasons  for Restricted  Access 
As  pointed  out  in  the preceding,  scientists  may  be motivated  to exclude 
others  from  using  their materials  or  information  by  scientific  competi 
tion,  commercial  motivation,  or  both.  Furthermore,  our  cost/benefit 
perspective  suggests  that  the  likelihood  of  excluding  depends  in part  on 
the  cost  of  complying  with  a  request,  both  in  terms  of  the  risk  of  losing 
priority  races  or  commercial  benefits  and  the burden  of  compliance. 
Empirical  work  has  examined  the  causes  of withholding  behaviors. 
One  consistent  finding  is  that  industry  funding  is  associated  with  de 
layed  publication  (Bekelman,  Li,  and  Gross  2003;  Blumenthal  et al.  1997; 
Campbell  et  al.  2002;  Cohen,  Florida,  and  Goe  1994; Cohen  et  al.  1998). 
Walsh,  Jiang,  and  Cohen  (2007)  find  that  publication  delay  is associ 
ated  with  commercial  activity  and  ties  to  small  and medium  enterprises 
(SMEs)  and  that  excluding  information  from  publications  is associated 
with  industry  funding.  Blumenthal  et al.  (1997)  and  Campbell  et al.  (2002) 16  Cohen  and Walsh 
find  that  commercial  activity  (including  but  not  limited  to patenting)  is 
associated  with  withholding  research  results.  Thus,  the  evidence  sug 
gests  that  the  prospect  of  diminished  commercial  gains  from  research 
findings  tends  to  increase  the  rate  of  excluding  others  from  access 
through  the use  of withholding  practically  excludable  research  results. 
This  benefit/cost  perspective  can  help  explain  not  only  the  higher 
rates  of  excluding  others  from  access  to  materials  or unpublished  results 
and  data  as  compared  to patented  knowledge,  but  can  also  help  us  un 
derstand  the  correlates  of  complying  with  requests  for  these  practically 
excludable  research  inputs.  The  costs  of  providing  materials  to  fellow 
researchers  potentially  include,  for  example,  a  diminished  advantage 
for  the  achievement  of priority  of  discovery,  lost  commercial  opportuni 
ties,  and  the  effort  and  cost  burden  of  actually  complying  with  the  re 
quest.28  Using  our  survey  data,  we  tested  two models  of  sharing  of ma 
terials  and  data,  one  from  the point  of  view  of  those  trying  to receive  the 
data  or material  (consumers)  and  one  from  the  point  of  view  of  those 
asked  to  provide  the  data  or materials  (suppliers;  Walsh,  Cho,  and 
Cohen  2007).  A  key  finding,  from  both  the  consumer  and  the  supplier 
models,  is  that  greater  scientific  competition  (measured  by  the  number 
of  labs  that  are  competing  with  the  lab  for publication  priority),  and  thus 
the  greater  the  chance  that  compliance  might  cost  a  lead  in  a priority 
race,  is associated  with  lower  probability  of  providing  access  to  the  re 
search  material  or  unpublished  data.29  For  those  who  have  been  asked 
to  send  materials  or  information,  a prior  history  of  commercial  activity 
is also  associated  with  an  increased  likelihood  of  noncompliance  with 
the  request,  suggesting  that  a potential  loss  of  competitive  advantage  in 
the market  increases  exclusionary  practices.  We  also  find  that  the  bur 
den  and  costs  of  compliance  with  requests  for  data  or materials  (mea 
sured  by  the  number  of  requests,  controlling  for  lab  funding)  reduces 
compliance  (see  also  Campbell  et  al.  2002).  Those  with  more  publica 
tions  in  the  last  two  years  are  also  more  likely  to  exclude,  perhaps  be 
cause  the  opportunity  cost  of  spending  time  complying  with  requests  is 
higher  for  those  who  are more  productive. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  those  trying  to  acquire  materials,  we  find 
that  being  asked  to  sign  a  materials  transfer  agreement  (MTA)  is associ 
ated  with  a greater  likelihood  of  receiving  the material  or  information.  It 
is  likely  that  compliance  is  lower  in  the  case where  there  is no MTA  be 
cause  the person  who  was  the  object  of  the materials  request  simply  did 
not  respond.  In other  words,  this  finding  is  consistent  with  the  claim 
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sistance  provides  practical  excludability.  On  the other  hand,  while  being 
asked  to sign  an  MTA  is associated  with  greater  access,  less  sharing  is as 
sociated  with  restrictive  terms  in  the MTA  (that  raise  the  cost  of  accept 
ing  the material),  including  demands  for  publication  review  (which 
may  reduce  the  ability  to  turn  the material  into  recognition  through  a  fu 
ture publication)  and  royalties  (which  may  reduce  the  commercial  pay 
off  of  future  results).  Finally,  we  find  that whether  a  material  is patented 
does  not  appear  to affect  access.30  Thus,  not  only  do  patents  per  se  rarely 
restrict  academics'  access  to  scientific  knowledge,  as  shown  in  the  pre 
ceding,  but  they  also  do  not  appear  to be  associated  with  restricted  ac 
cess  to  materials  or unpublished  information. 
Although  some  evidence  suggests  that  the norm  of  sharing  research 
materials  and  results  may  be weakening  in biom?dical  research,  sharing 
is  still  common,  with  the  average  academic  researcher  in biom?dical 
fields  making  three  to  four  requests  per  year,  about  80 percent  of which 
are  fulfilled  (as  reported  by  those making  requests).  The  strength  of  this 
norm  is  impressive  once  one  considers  that  compliance  often  involves 
costs,  including  out-of-pocket  expenses  (for  copying  and  sending  mate 
rials, which  can  be  significant  in  the  case  of  a genetically  modified  ani 
mal)  as well  as  the  risk  of  losing  a  competitive  advantage  (either  aca 
demic  or  commercial)  by  sharing  access  to a  material  that may  be  key  to 
future  success. 
VI.  Reflections  on  Empirical  Findings 
As  shown  in  the  preceding,  academics  are  rarely  excluded  from  using 
others'  patented  published  research?largely  because  they  rarely  know 
whether  a published  discovery  is patented  or not  and  are  apparently  not 
that  concerned.  They  simply  want  to get  their work  done.  Thus,  legal  ex 
cludability  due  to patents  does  not  appear  in practice  to  impose  an  im 
portant  impediment  to academic  research  in biomedicine,  and much  of 
what's  published  continues  to  reside  effectively  (if not  legally)  in  the 
public  domain.  What  is private  and  excludable,  however,  are  those  in 
puts  into  scientific  research  that  are  privately  possessed  and  often  diffi 
cult  to replicate,  such  as materials  and  data.  In our  view,  the key  issue  is 
the  impact  of  reputation-driven  science  on  access  to such  privately  held 
research  inputs. 
As  suggested  by  Eisenberg  (1987)  and  supported  by  the  empirical 
findings  of Walsh,  Cho,  and  Cohen  (2007),  biom?dical  researchers  can 
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of  data,  materials,  and  some  methods.  Such  inputs  do  not  simply  pro 
vide  the basis  for a given  publication,  but  also  a stream  of  ongoing  work, 
making  the  researcher  all  the more  reluctant  to relinquish  his  or her  con 
trol,  as doing  so may  compromise  the  researcher's  ability  to claim  prior 
ity growing  out  of  future  work. 
As  reported  in  Walsh  et  al.  (2007),  it  is  to materials  and  data  that  bio 
medical  researchers  will  occasionally  refuse  access  to others,  and whether 
such  materials  are  patented  appears  to have  little  to do  with  whether 
they  are  shared.  Such  inputs  into  the  research  process  are  often  not  part 
of  the  "scientific  commons."  Others  can  be  excluded  from  accessing 
these  inputs?and  are,  notwithstanding  the  strictures  of  granting  agen 
cies  and  journals  such  as  Science  and Nature.31 
Although  academics  will  sometimes  exclude  others  from  using  their 
research  inputs  when  they  can,  such  exclusion  is  still  observed,  how 
ever,  only  in  a minority  of  instances.  As  noted  in  the  preceding,  about 
four-fifths  of  requests  for materials  by  academic  biom?dical  researchers 
to other  academics  are  satisfied  (Walsh  et al.  2007).  An  obvious  question 
is  why  do  four-fifths  of  academic  researchers  comply  with  requests  for 
research  inputs  in  light  of  reasons  and  ability  not  to? One  possibility  is 
that  academics  also  benefit  from  such  sharing,  perhaps  by  realizing  com 
plementarities  and  efficiencies  from  participating  in networks  based  on 
reciprocal  exchange.  Norms  also  play  an  important  role. We  observe, 
however,  that  the  incidence  of  priority-driven  restrictive  practices  and 
presumably  the  strength  of  norms  around  sharing  are  not  uniform  in 
science  (e.g., Walsh  and  Hong  2003).  As  documented  by  Sulston  and 
Ferry  (2002)  in  their  discussion  of  the  development  of  rules  for  the  dis 
semination  of  genomic  sequence  data,  norms  regarding  disclosure,  data 
sharing,  and  so  on  can  differ  sharply  even  between  related  scientific 
communities.32  Clearly,  there  are  norms  of  exchange  that  apply  to dif 
ferent  degrees  across  individuals  and  communities,  and  it  is not  clear 
why  such  norms  take  hold  for  some  individuals  and  in some  settings  but 
not  in others. 
VII.  Implications 
Although  academic  research?especially  in published  form?has  some 
elements  that  fit  the  common  characterization  of  a public  good?satis 
fying  the  conditions  of  nonexcludability  and  nonrivalry  in use?other 
important  elements,  notably  its  inputs  and  reputational  effects,  do  not. 
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research.  What  we  observe  in  the  empirical  results  reported  in  the  pre 
ceding  for academic  biom?dical  research  is that where  excludability  ap 
pears  to be  readily  enforced  for privately  possessed  inputs  into biom?d 
ical  research,  it sometimes  is, and  this  is especially  manifest  in the  sharing 
of materials  and,  to  some  extent,  data. 
We  have  argued  that  academic  biom?dical  scientists  work  at  least 
partly  for private  (academic  and  commercial)  rewards,  and  these  incen 
tives may  drive  how  they  interact  and  cooperate  with  the  scientific  com 
munity  The  notion  that  researchers  make  decisions  about  the  sharing 
of materials  and  knowledge  to maximize  academic  and  commercial 
priority-linked  rewards  provides  a  simple  way  of  thinking  about  the 
factors  that might  drive  the  sort  of withholding  and  other  behaviors  that 
have  now  been  studied  by  many.  A  number  of  the  findings  from  the 
Walsh  et  al.  study  make  sense  from  this  vantage  point,  including  the 
negative  effect  of  the out-of-pocket  costs  of  compliance  with  requests  for 
materials  as well  as  the  negative  effect  of  the  intensity  of  competition 
across  labs  on  compliance.  This  perspective  also  explains  the  greater 
likelihood  of  exclusion  for privately  held  materials  and  other  research 
inputs  as  compared  to patented,  published  findings  in  that  the  costs  of 
exclusion  are much  less  for  the  former  than  for  the  latter. On  the benefits 
side  of  this  framework,  it also  appears  that  researchers'  expected  payoffs 
to behaviors  that might  favor  the winning  of  priority  races may  stimu 
late  exclusionary  practices.  For  example,  the Walsh  et  al.  (2007)  results 
suggest  that where  the  expectations  of  commercial  returns  to academic 
discoveries  are higher,  the  more  likely  it is that  an  academic  scientist  will 
engage  in  withholding  behavior. 
There  are  important  factors,  however,  that may  affect  biom?dical  re 
searchers'  exclusionary  behaviors  that  have  not  been  considered  in any 
broad-based  empirical  studies.  For  example,  as  noted  in  the  preceding, 
offsetting  the  negative  incentive  effect  of  any  diminished  potential  for 
achieving  priority  of  discovery,  sharing  may  also  allow  academics  to 
benefit  from  the  inflow  of  information,  materials,  and  ideas  that  come 
with  participation  in  relationships  and  networks  that  involve  the  recip 
rocal  exchange  of  such  research  inputs.  The  impact  on  behavior  of  the 
potential  realization  of  such  complementarities  from mutual  exchange 
has  not,  however,  been  examined.  Another  related  factor  is  the  social 
disapproval  and  associated  sanctions  that may  be  a  significant  cost  of 
withholding  behavior.  Indeed,  we  conjectured  in  the preceding  that  the 
observation  of withholding  behavior  in only  a  minority  of  instances  can 
be  at  least  partly  explained  by  powerful  social  norms  that  guide  the  con 20  Cohen  and Walsh 
duct  of  biom?dical  research.33  We  do  not,  however,  have  direct  statisti 
cal  evidence  on  the  strength  or  role  of  such  norms  in contemporary  bio 
medical  research. 
Another  important  omission  from  prior  work,  however,  is a consider 
ation  of  the  role  that  government  and  other  funding  of  biom?dical  re 
search  might  play  in affecting  noncompliance  with  requests  for materi 
als,  data,  and  so  on.  Consider,  for  example,  a possible  impact  of  higher 
levels  of National  Institutes  of Health  (NIH)  funding  on  exclusionary 
behavior.  If  the  expected  marginal  payoff  to  exclusionary  practices  in 
creases  with  the  level  of NIH  funding  by  conferring  an  advantage  in  the 
competition  for more  sizable  grants  (perhaps  by  qualifying  the  appli 
cant  uniquely  to  carry  out  the  proposed  project),  then  growth  in NIH 
funding  may  stimulate  exclusionary  behaviors,  especially  if  funding  is 
concentrated  in  larger,  but  fewer,  grants.  Indeed,  this  raises  the  possi 
bility  that  the  rapid  run-up  in NIH  funding  over  the  past  decades  may 
itself  account  for  some  of  the  increase  in noncooperative  behaviors  ob 
served  among  academic  scientists  in biomedicine.34  Of  course,  numer 
ous  other  factors  could  have  affected  changes  in withholding  behavior 
during  this  same  period,  including  the  growing  emphasis  on  commer 
cial  spin-offs  from  academic  medicine.  Moreover,  there  are  reasons  to 
believe  that NIH  funding  and  associated  policies  could  have  dampened 
such  behaviors  as well.35 
Regarding  the  impact  of  public  and  other  funding,  the more  general 
point  is  that  such  funding  may  affect  the way  scientific  research  is done, 
its  cooperative  character,  and,  in  turn,  its  efficiency.  Indeed,  federal 
agencies  and  other  granting  institutions  understand  the nature  of  the  in 
centives  discussed  in  the preceding  that  condition  the  conduct  of  the  re 
search  itself.  The  NIH  reflected  this  understanding  when  it imposed  re 
quirements  on  its grantees  regarding  the  sharing  of  data  and materials 
(NIH  1999).  Notwithstanding  the  question  about  the  degree  to which 
such  strictures  are  enforced,  one must  be  cognizant,  however,  about  the 
effect  of  such  policies  that  compel  the  sharing  of materials,  data,  and 
other  privately  held  information  on  the  incentives  to do  the  research. 
The  imposition  of  strictures  designed  to dampen  exclusionary  prac 
tices  raises  the  question  of  the  net  effect  of  such  practices  on  scientific 
progress.  As  suggested  in  the  preceding,  the  answer  turns  on  the  trade 
off  between  the  efficiency  and  complementarity  benefits  of  knowledge 
exchange,  on  the one  hand,  versus  the possible  appropriability  incentive 
effects  of  such  on  the  other.  If academics  are  deprived  of  their  ability  to 
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of  the  payoff  to  their  research?36  And,  if  so, will  that  dampen  their  in 
centive  to  conduct  the  research  to begin  with?37  Although  one  would 
think  that public  subsidy  and  the  expectation  of  intrinsic  rewards  might 
diminish  the  likelihood  of  such  an  outcome,  the  question  has  not  been 
empirically  explored  in any  systematic  fashion.38 
In addition  to  compelling  the  exchange  of materials  and  research  in 
puts,  one  might  consider  other  institutional  schemes  that  increase  the 
scientists'  incentives  to  share  materials,  data,  and  other  inputs.  One 
might  consider,  for  example,  supporting  the  expansion  of  biom?dical 
resource  centers  (BRCs)  and  online  databases.  Furman  and  Stern  (2005) 
show  that,  by  reducing  the  cost  of  accessing  materials  (as well  as  certi 
fying  quality),  depositing  materials  in a BRC  results  in a  significant  in 
crease  in  citations  to  scientists,  especially  in  later  years,  after  most 
publications  are  no  longer  actively  cited.39  Given  the  ease  of  access 
and  reputational  benefits  associated  with  shared  repositories,  it  may  be 
worth  exploring  how  to expand  their  use.  It  may  be  that  greater  subsi 
dies  to  these  institutions  would  allow  them  to  take  on  greater  numbers 
of materials  and would  encourage  scientists  to switch  from  peer-to-peer 
exchanges  to  institutionally  mediated  exchanges. 
VIII.  Conclusion 
Our  results  suggest  that,  in biomedicine,  there  is  little  basis  to be  con 
cerned  over  access  to others'  published  research  results.  In contrast,  ac 
ademics  are  able  and  willing  to exclude  others  from  using  research  in 
puts,  especially  materials  and  unpublished  information  where  exclusion 
is a simple  matter.  Even  these  practically  excludable  research  inputs  are, 
however,  shared  in  the majority  of  cases.  Where  academics  do  exclude 
others  from  the  use  of  inputs,  the means  of  exclusion  are  typically  se 
crecy  and  control  over  materials.  Patents  are  a  less  effective  means  of  ex 
clusion  because  their  enforcement  involves  a  costly  process  of  search 
and  legal  challenges,  with  few  associated  benefits.  In  contrast,  control 
over  information  or materials  can  confer  exclusivity  at  low  cost,  even 
through  such  passive  means  as not  responding  to requests.  We  also  find 
that while  commercial  motives  can  generate  noncooperative  behavior, 
such  behavior  is also  endemic  to  the  reputation-reward  system  of  aca 
demic  science. 
Our  simple  logic  that  focuses  on  the  expected  costs  and  benefits  to 
noncooperative  behaviors  suggests  we  should  expand  our  purview  be 
yond  patents  when  we  try  to understand  what  might  drive  such  be 22  Cohen  and Walsh 
haviors  across  academic  researchers.  Rather,  when  considering  policy 
reforms  designed  to promote  the  free  flow  of  research  inputs  across  ac 
ademics,  we  should  examine  the  underlying  determinants  of  the  costs 
and  benefits  of  sharing  versus  excluding  and  the  associated  incentives 
to  conduct  the  research  to begin  with. 
Endnotes 
We  thank  Robert  Cook-Deegan,  Mary  Frank  Fox,  Brent  Goldfarb,  Josh  Lerner,  Scott 
Rockart,  Scott  Stern  and  the  participants  in  the NBER  Innovation  Policy  and  Economics 
Workshop,  Washington,  DC,  for  comments.  The  authors  gratefully  acknowledge  the  fi 
nancial  support  of  the National  Academies'  Board  on  Science,  Technology,  and  Economic 
Policy  and  the  Program  on  Science,  Technology,  and  Law. 
1.  Indeed,  Mowery  et  al.  (2004)  suggest  that  the  Bayh-Dole  Amendment  was  itself  partly  an 
outgrowth  of  the  pursuit  of  licensing  relationships  on  the  part  of  a handful  of  universities. 
2.  The  basic  proposition  developed  by  Evenson  and  Kislev  (1976)  and  Nelson  (1982)  is 
that  the more  approaches  to  a given  technological  objective  that  are  tried,  the  greater  the 
likely  contribution  to  technical  advance  (in  terms  of  improvements  in product  quality  or 
performance,  or manufacturing  costs)  of  the  approach  that  is ultimately  selected  by  the 
market  (or  some  other  mechanism  or  authority).  In other  words,  society  may  not  be  best 
served  by  having,  for  example,  only  Geron  trying  to  employ  human  embryonic  stem  cell 
technology  to  create  pancreatic  replacement  tissue. 
3.  Owen-Smith  (2003)  also  shows  that  this  accumulative  advantage  process  works  at  the 
level  of  institutions  competing  for prestige  as well  and,  in  this  respect,  aligns  the  incentives 
of  academics  and  their  institutions. 
4.  Merton  (1957,  640)  states,  "Once  he  has  made  his  contribution,  the  scientist  no  longer 
has  exclusive  rights  of  access  to  it.  It becomes  part  of  the  public  domain  of  science.  Nor  has 
he  the  right  of  regulating  its use  by  others  by  withholding  it unless  it  is acknowledged  as 
his.  In  short,  property  rights  in  science  become  whittled  down  to  just  this  one:  the  recog 
nition  by  others  of  the  scientist's  distinctive  part  in having  brought  the  result  into  being." 
5.  As  Merton  ([1957]  1973,  292)  put  it,  "Then  are  found  those  happy  circumstances  in 
which  self-interest  and  moral  obligation  coincide  and  fuse." 
6.  Exclusionary  practices  can  be  attenuated  due  to  the  social  opprobrium  that  they  may 
elicit.  But  recognizing  the  power  of  these  incentives  not  to  share,  granting  agencies,  scien 
tific  journals,  and  even  foundations  try  to  compel  the  beneficiaries  of  their  various  func 
tions  to disclose  their  data,  methods,  and  materials  (Eisenberg  and  Rai  2006). 
7.  Researchers  may,  for  example,  delay  announcing  a discovery  until  a patent  application 
has  been  filed  or  possibly  until  the  application  is published.  In  the  case  of  the OncoMouse, 
for  example,  Leder  (funded  by  DuPont  as well  as NIH)  submitted  a patent  and  delayed 
publication.  This  actually  cost  him  scientific  priority  over  Palmiter  and  Brinster  (whose  pa 
per  was  published  four months  before  Leder's  and  about  the  same  time  as  Leder's  patent 
application)  but  gave  Harvard  (and  DuPont)  patent  priority  (Murray  2006).  Palmiter  and 
Brinster  did  not  file  for  a patent,  even  though  they  had  industry  funding. 
8.  These  "academic  appropriability  strategies"  are  roughly  analogous  to  the  appropri 
ability  strategies  employed  by  firms  to  protect  the  profits  due  to  industrial  innovation Real  Impediments  to  Academic  Biom?dical  Research  23 
documented  by  Levin  et  al.  (1987)  and  Cohen,  Nelson,  and Walsh  (2000).  Biagioli  (2006) 
provides  a wonderfully  detailed  account  of  the  different  "appropriability  strategies"  em 
ployed  by  Galileo  to  increase  his  academic  credit  and  authority. 
9.  "To maintain  his  property,  Descartes  implores  his  friend  Mersenne,  'I also  beg  you  to 
tell  him  [Hobbes]  as  little  as  possible  about  what  you  know  of my  unpublished  opinions, 
for  if I'm  not  greatly  mistaken,  he  is a  man  who  is seeking  to acquire  a  reputation  at my  ex 
pense  and  through  shady  practices'"  (quoted  in  Merton  1957,652). 
10. Merton  (1957),  for  example,  cites  scientists  long  ago  submitting  sealed  manuscripts  to 
learned  societies  or  announcing  results  in  code  in  order  to  establish  priority  without  tip 
ping  off  their  competitors: 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  for  example,  and  even  as  late  as  the  nineteenth,  discoveries 
were  sometimes  reported  in  the  form  of  anagrams?as  with  Galileo's  "triple  star"  of  Sat 
urn  and  Hooke's  law  of  tension?for  the  double  purpose  of  establishing  priority  of  con 
ception  and  of  yet  not  putting  rivals  on  to one's  original  ideas,  until  they  had  been  further 
worked  out....  As  late  as  the  nineteenth  century,  the  physicists  Balfour  Stewart  and  P. G. 
Tait  reintroduced  this  practice  and  "to  secure  priority 
...  [took]  the  unusual  step  of  pub 
lishing  [their  idea]  as  an  anagram  in Nature  some  months  before  the  publication  of  the 
book."  (Sir  J. J.  Thompson,  Recollections  and Reflections  [London:  G.  Bell,  1936,22;  quoted  in 
Merton  ([1957] 1973,315) 
A  more  recent  example  comes  from  research  on  superconductivity,  where  Paul  Chu  was 
accused  of  deliberately  introducing  a  "typo"  into  his  two  papers  submitted  to Physical  Re 
view  Letters  (substituting  Yb  [ytterbium]  for Y  [yttrium]  in a key  formula)  in order  to  throw 
off  reviewers,  who  were  also  potential  competitors.  He  also  applied  for  a patent  after  sub 
mitting  the  papers.  Although  reviewers  are  supposed  to keep  manuscripts  confidential, 
news  of  the  discovery  leaked  (although  the  leak  included  the mistaken  formula).  Chu  then 
corrected  the  error  before  submitting  the  final  proofs  to  the  journal,  causing  some  who  fol 
lowed  the  (incorrect)  leaked  formula  to  accuse  Chu  of  deliberately  trying  to  throw  them 
off  the  trail.  Others  in  the  field  say  that,  even  if  it  was  the  honest  mistake  Chu  said  it  was, 
they  would  understand  someone  doing  this  deliberately  in  such  a high-stakes  race  as  su 
perconductivity  was  in  the  late  1980s,  with  Nobel  prizes  and  possibly  substantial  com 
mercial  applications  at  stake  (Kolata  1987;  see  also  Fox  1994). 
11.  For  example,  due  to dissatisfaction  over  not  receiving  proper  scientific  credit  for  con 
tributing  avian  flu  samples,  Chinese  scientists  became  very  reluctant  to  share  these  valu 
able  research  materials,  saying  that  they  would  conduct  the  research  themselves  in order 
to  ensure  they  received  the  credit  for  any  discoveries  in  this  important  research  field  (Za 
miska,  February  24,2006,  Al,  A6). 
12.  Ironically,  although  patents  may  enable  the  realization  of  financial  returns  to discov 
ery,  they  also  protect  the  information  that  is disclosed  and  thus  may  motivate  more  dis 
closure,  at  least  as  compared  with  secrecy. 
13.  Patents  covering  published  results  may  also  reduce  the  incentive  of  other  researchers 
to do  follow-on  research,  not  because  they  cannot  access  the  results,  but  because  they may 
have  to  share  the  rents  associated  with  any  follow-on  discoveries  with  the  patent  holder  if 
the  prior  patent  blocks  the  follow-on  invention.  This  reduced  incentive  for  exploiting  a 
particular  published  discovery  may  partially  explain  the Murray  and  Stern  (2005)  and 
Sampat  (2004)  findings  that  patented  results  are  less  likely  to be  cited. 
14.  Such  foundational  discoveries  may  be  either  rival-in-use  or  not.  An  example  of  a 
foundational  discovery  that  is  not  rival-in-use  is  the method  of  recombinant  DNA,  or 24 Cohen  and Walsh 
polymerase  chain  reaction  (PCR)  technology,  both  of  which  have  wide  applications.  A 
foundational  discovery  that may  well  be  rival-in-use  and  that  offers  the  promise  of  creat 
ing?and  replacing?different  types  of  human  tissue  is  that  of  human  embryonic  stem 
technology.  This  is  rival-in-use  in  the  sense  that  if,  for  example,  one  firm  builds  on  that 
technology  to  create  pancreatic  tissue,  that  product  would  clearly  compete  with  another 
firm  creating  the  same  type  of  tissue,  even  if  the  particular  way  in which  the  technology 
had  been  employed  differs. 
15. More  generally,  where  follow-on  research  depends  on  access  to numerous  patents,  the 
transactions  costs  and  accumulated  licensing  fees may  also  restrict  access  to domains  of  re 
search  that would  build  on  such  upstream  developments.  For  example,  some  research  pro 
grams  dedicated  to discovering  therapies  or  drugs  require  access  to numerous  targets  that 
may  be  associated  with  a particular  disease  process.  If each  target  is patented  and  a  license 
fee  is  charged,  the  accumulated  licensing  fees  can  restrict  access,  perhaps  significantly. 
16.  Pressman  et  al.  (2006)  find,  however,  that many  of  these  "exclusively"  licensed  patents 
are  licensed  to more  than  one  firm  (either  divided  by  field  of  use  or  geography,  or  some 
times  in  series),  which  suggests  that  access  restrictions  may  not  be  as  severe  as  the  condi 
tion  of  exclusivity  might  suggest. 
17.  If  we  use  as  the  denominator  only  those  scientists  who  knew  of  a  relevant  patent,  16 
percent  had  been  delayed,  though  none  abandoned  a project.  It is not  clear  which  is  the  ap 
propriate  risk  set,  all  researchers  or  only  those  who  explicitly  knew  of  a  relevant  patent. 
18.  This  number  is not  reported  to have  increased  significantly  since  the  Madey  v. Duke  de 
cision,  nor  does  it differ  significantly  between  scientists  that  had  been  alerted  by  their  in 
stitutions  to  check  for  patents  compared  to  those  that  did  not  receive  such  instruction. 
19.  In  the  area  of  gene  patents  covering  a diagnostic  test,  there  are more  instances  of  patent 
assertions  that  impede  research  (Cho  et  al.  2003; Merz  et  al.  2002).  For  example,  Merz  et  al. 
(2002)  find  that  30  percent  of  clinical  labs  report  not  developing  or  abandoning  testing  for 
the  hemochromatosis  gene  (HFE)  after  the  patent  was  issued.  Cho  et  al.  (2003)  find  that  25 
percent  of  labs  had  abandoned  one  or more  genetic  tests  due  to  patents,  with  Myriad's 
patents  among  the most  frequently  mentioned.  This  activity  is,  on  one  level,  a  competing 
commercial  activity,  and,  hence,  it  is not  surprising  to find  the  patent  owner  asserting  his 
rights.  To  the  extent,  however,  that  clinical  research  is  intimately  integrated  with  diagnos 
tic  testing,  especially  in  the U.S.  funding  system,  demands  by  patent  owners  to  exclusive 
rights  to  conduct  tests  could  affect  the  progress  of  science  in  these  areas  (Cho  et  al.  2003). 
Furthermore,  the  potential  for  problems  of  access  may  be  diminishing  due  to  a declining 
number  of  patents  granted  on  these  technologies  in  the  last  few  years  (especially  in Europe 
and  perhaps  in  Japan).  Part  of  this  decline  may  be  due  to  firms  recognizing  that  the  high 
cost  of  acquiring  large  numbers  of  these  patents  may  not  be  justified  (Hopkins  et  al.  2007). 
20.  Murray  and  Stern  (2005)  based  their  analysis  on  a  sample  of  "patent-paper"  pairs 
based  on  publications  in Nature  Biotech,  which  tends  to be more  downstream  in  its  orien 
tation.  More  generally,  the  causes  and  implications  of  this  relationship  between  patents 
and  citations  are,  however,  unclear.  In  particular,  is  this  drop  in  citations  a  result  of  a 
change  in  research  practices  or  simply  of  citation  practices  (i.e.,  an  unwillingness  to  an 
nounce  infringement  in print)?  Even  if  it  is  the  former,  does  this  simply  reflect  the  change 
in  incentives,  leading  researchers  (especially  industry  researchers)  to  redirect  their  efforts 
into  less-encumbered  research  areas? 
21.  The  relatively  small  number  of  these  gene  patents  that  have  been  issued  in Europe  and 
Japan  suggests  that  "going  offshore"  may  be  a relatively  straightforward  solution  for global 
pharmaceutical  firms  (Hopkins  et  al.  2007). Real  Impediments  to  Academic  Biom?dical  Research  25 
22.  For  example,  Human  Genome  Sciences  (HGS)  has  a  key  patent  related  to  the 
chemokine  (C-C motif)  receptor  5  (CCR5),  which  is an  important  research  tool  for  study 
ing HIV  infection.  However,  the  relation  between  this  patented  receptor  and  HIV  infection 
was  discovered  by  NIH  researchers,  who  were  using  the  patent  without  a  license.  HGS's 
reaction  to  this  infringement  is  telling.  Rather  than  sue  for  infringement,  the  firm  wel 
comed  this  unlicensed  use  of  its  technology,  which  made  the  patent  substantially  more 
valuable.  And  the  firm's  owner  declared  he  would  welcome  additional  research  by  uni 
versity  and  government  researchers  and  would  even  provide  necessary  research  tools 
(Marshall  2000). 
23.  The  case  of  the OncoMouse  is  illustrative.  Murray  (2006)  describes  this  as  a very  small, 
close  community  that was  morally  outraged  by  the  licensing  terms  that  DuPont  (and  by 
extension,  Leder  and  Harvard)  were  demanding  for  access  to  this  technology.  Interest 
ingly,  this  is not  a  case  of withholding  access  (because  anyone  could  use  the  technology  if 
they  would  agree  to  the  terms,  the most  onerous  of which  was  a  reach  through  claim  on 
future  discoveries  as well  as  publication  review  and  requirements  to give  regular  progress 
reports  to DuPont).  Rather,  it  was  the  violation  of  the mouse  community's  norms  of  free 
exchange  of materials  that  seems  to have  led  to  loud  protests  and  to NIH  stepping  in  to 
renegotiate  access  terms.  And  it  may  have  been  DuPont's  outsider  status  that  led  them  to 
ignore  these  reciprocity  norms  and  aggressively  assert  their  patent  rights. 
24.  For  firms,  either  an  anticommons  failure  or  blocked  or  expensive  access  to  some  foun 
dational  patented  discovery  requires  not  that  any  one  strategy  for  overcoming  such  prob 
lems  be  unavailable,  but  that  the  entire  suite  of working  solutions  be  ineffective. 
25.  If  the  input  is difficult  to duplicate  on  your  own,  the  owner  of  that  input  may  be  able 
to  readily  exclude  others  from  using  their  research  input.  Indeed,  as  noted  in  the  follow 
ing, Walsh  et  al.  (2007)  found  that  it  was  predominantly  the  lack  of  capabilities  or  the  time 
and  cost  involved?more  than  the  existence  of  a patent  on  a desired  material?that  leads 
scientists  to  make  requests  for materials  rather  than  duplicating  the materials  themselves. 
26.  There  is  the  possibility  that  these  figures  could  understate  the  incidence  of  incomplete 
or  delayed  publication  due  to  social  desirability  response  bias. 
27.  While  possibly  hurting  the  researchers  who  make  such  requests,  denial  of  requests 
does  not  necessarily  hurt  society.  For  example,  if such  denials  lead  to  less  duplicative  re 
search  and  a  greater  variety  of  projects  undertaken,  society  may  be  better  off  as  a  conse 
quence  (cf.  Walsh,  Arora,  and  Cohen  2003a). 
28.  As  discussed  in  the  following,  Furman  and  Stern  (2005)  also  suggest  that  such  provi 
sion  can  also  confer  reputational  benefits. 
29.  Walsh  and  Hong  (2003)  and  Blumenthal  et  al.  (2006)  also  find  that  scientific  competi 
tion  is  associated  with  excluding  others  from  using  materials,  data,  or  ongoing  research 
results. 
30.  Walsh  and  Hong  (2003)  find  a  similar  result  that  patents  are  not  associated  with 
greater  secrecy  about  ongoing  research. 
31.  Priority-driven  attention  to  secrecy  on  the  part  of  academics  is  ironically  reinforced 
by  the  practices  of major  scientific  journals  as well,  including  Science  and  Nature,  which 
strictly  regulate  what  may  or may  not  be  disclosed  from  an  accepted  manuscript  prior  to 
publication  and  how  that  disclosure  might  occur. 
32.  The  extraordinary  openness  associated  with  the Human  Genome  Project  (daily  pub 
lishing  of  sequence  data)  was  the  result  of  a  contentious  negotiation  within  the  commu 26 Cohen  and Walsh 
nity,  with  many  arguing  that  those  conducting  the  research,  even  though  it  was  publicly 
funded,  should  have  a period  of  exclusivity  over  the  data  (Sulston  and  Ferry  2002). 
33.  Indeed,  Robert  Cook-Deegan  (personal  communication)  suggests  that  such  disap 
proval  is  institutionalized  in  the NIH  study  sections  that  evaluate  grant  proposals  in  that 
a  reputation  for  not  providing  data  to other  scholars  can  apparently,  under  some  circum 
stances,  affect  the  award  of  grants  or  the  terms  under  which  a grant  is awarded. 
34.  As  noted  in  the preceding,  Walsh  et  al.  (2007)  observed  that,  for  similar  samples  of  aca 
demic  genomics  researchers,  noncompliance  appears  to have  grown  from  about  10 per 
cent of requests in the 1997 to 1999 period  (Campbell et al. 2002) to 18  percent  in the 2003 
to  2004  period.  At  the  same  time,  NIH  constant-dollar  obligations  for  academic  research 
more  than  doubled,  jumping  from  $6.6  billion  dollars  (denominated  in  constant  2000  dol 
lars)  in  1997  to  $13.5  billion  in 2003  (National  Science  Board  2006). 
35.  For  example,  if,  in  certain  fields,  NIH  grants  had  become  sufficiently  plentiful  and 
widely  distributed,  then  researchers  may  actually  have  perceived  a diminution  in  compe 
tition  for  them.  Of  course,  NIH  guidelines  regarding  the  sharing  of  data  and materials,  dis 
cussed  in  the  following,  could  also  dampen  the  incidence  of  exclusionary  practices. 
36.  When  recommending  that  scientists  provide  unrestricted  access  to data  and  materials 
associated  with  published  results,  the National  Academy  of  Sciences  (2003)  recognized  the 
importance  of  considering  the  effect  of  such  policies  on  scientists'  incentives  when  they 
took  the  unusual  step  of  providing  a minority  report,  arguing  that  it  was  appropriate  for 
authors  to  withhold  research  inputs  in order  to ensure  that  the  author  can  individually  ap 
propriate  the  scientific  and  commercial  potential  in his  or  her  discoveries.  This  minority 
report  highlights  the  legitimacy  within  the  scientific  community  of  some  forms  of  re 
stricted  access  and  emphasizes  the  complexity  of  balancing  the  norms  of  sharing  with  the 
need  to provide  incentives. 
37.  The  case  of  the  Alliance  for  Cell  Signaling  (AfCS)  is  illustrative.  This  project  is  at 
tempting  to map  all  of  the  cell  signal  pathways  and  provide  open  access  to  results,  even 
before  publication  in  journals  (Abbot  2002).  To  accomplish  this,  the AfCS  has  hired  a  team 
of  researchers  to  conduct  the  analyses  and  post  the  results.  Project  members  are  not  al 
lowed  to  submit  papers  to  journals  until  at  least  one  month  after  posting  the  data  for public 
use.  We  wonder  if such  hired-hand  research  is sufficient  incentive  for  an  academically  am 
bitious  young  scholar.  Or,  to put  it differently,  would  a premier  academic  scientist  recom 
mend  this  position  to his  or  her  most  promising  students  (Cohen  2005;  cf. Rai  2005)? 
38.  See  Cohen  and  Sauermann  (2007)  for  a discussion  of  the  importance  of  considering  in 
trinsic  incentives  for understanding  individual  researcher  performance. 
39.  This  observation  raises  the  possibility  that  scientists  are  acting  irrationally  when  they 
withhold  in order  to  ensure  greater  reputational  benefits.  However,  this  possibility  must 
be  tempered  with  the  understanding  that  both  commercial  and  reputational  benefits,  es 
pecially  in  the  short  term,  might  be  better  served  by  closely  controlling  distribution  of 
one's  research  results. 
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